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CO19NrTS
TORTS-INADEQUATE VEI icrs-PARTL l R-rArLs.-The case had been
submitted to the jury. The plaintiff, having shown special damages
from the automobile accident of almost $800 for hospital and medical
expenses and approximately $2,600 for lost wages, as well as sig-
nificant pain and suffering, was confident that her award would
approach the nearly $26,000 asked. The defendant was equally
confident that the jury would agree with his claim of contributory
negligence and exonerate him entirely. When the jury returned,
it rendered a verdict for plaintiff for "$2,000 total:"
Plaintiff, unsatisfied with the verdict, appealed on the sole ground
of inadequacy, and asked for a new trial limited solely to the issue
of damages. Defendant, willing to accept the verdict and confident
that the worst he could expect would be a complete new trial, did
not cross-appeal but simply argued that the size of the award was
supported by the evidence, and that, in any event, a partial new
trial was not appropriate in the event of a reversal for inadequate
damages since there was an inference of a compromise verdict.
Held: Reversed for partial retrial. The mere fact that a verdict was
reached by compromise is not recognized as an independent ground
for reversal, and an award of damages concludes the issue of liability
against a defendant who does not cross-appeal. Therefore, a plaintiff
who has received an award which does not compensate him for
special damages both pleaded and proved is entitled to a new trial
on the basis of failure of the verdict to conform to the law and to
the evidence; and this new trial may be limited to the issue of
damages. Nolan v. Spears, 432 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1968).
The power of courts to set aside verdicts for excessiveness has
long been recognized,1 and the same is true of verdicts which award
inadequate special damages.2 Indeed, in Kentucky this was the only
justification for a reversal for inadequacy until the repeal of section
341 and amendment of section 340(4) of the Civil Code of Practice
in 1936.3 The Civil Code of Practice was adopted in 18514 and the
provisions dealing with new trials due to excessive or inadequate
1 See Taylor v. Giger, 3 Ky. 595, 1 Hardin 586 (1808), in which the principle
is first recognized in Kentucky, and Outten v. Barnes, 16 Ky. (1 IAtt. Sel. Ca.)
136 (1812), in which it is first applied.
Taylor v. Howser, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 465 (1876).
3 An Act to Repeal Section Three Hundred Forty-One (341) and to Amend
and Re-enact Section Three Hundred Forty (340) of Article Five (5), Chapter
Two (2), Title Nine (9) of the Kentucky Code of Practice in Civil Cases,
Relating to New Trials Ch. 27, [1963] Ky. Acts 67.
4 An Act to Establish a Code of Practice in Civil Cases in the Courts of This
Commonwealth, Ch. 616, [18501 Ky. Acts 106.
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awards were a correct codification of the existing common law.5
Although renumbered twice6 and slightly amended on one occasion,7
the effect of these rules remained unchanged8 until their ultimate
repeal.
The pertinent language of section 341 was:
A new trial shall not be granted on account of the smallness of
damages in an action for an injury to the person or reputation,
nor in any other action where the damages equal the actual
pecuniary injury sustained.
This was repeatedly and uniformly interpreted to mean that new
trials should not be granted on account of the smallness of general
damages,9 but that a new trial should be granted where the victorious
plaintiff was not fully compensated for special, out of pocket, dam-
ages.' 0 The basis for this distinction was that special damages were
measurable and certain of proof and assessment, and that a failure
to award for this clearly demonstrable loss was in obvious disregard
of the evidence and law of the case." General damages, on the other
hand, were necessarily speculative as to amount and:
... [I]f any sum, however small, is allowed for general damages, a
new trial cannot be granted, because of the smallness of that sum,
5Jesse v. Shuck, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 463, 12 S.W. 304 (1889); Taylor v. Howser,
75 Ky. (12 Bush) 465 (1876); Colyer v. Huff, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 34 (1813).6 An Act Amending the Code of Practice, Ch. 267, [1853] Ky. Acts 24,
resulted in a change in the number of the pertinent statute from § 382 to § 370,
with no change in the text. An Act Concerning the Codes of Practice, Ch. 1020,
[1875] Ky. Acts 131, resulted in the renumbering of the statute from § 370 to
§ 341, with a textual addition discussed in note 7 infra.
7An Act Concerning the Codes of Practice, Ch. 1020, [1875] Ky. Acts 131
in addition to renumbering the provisions, amended it to add: ". . . [N]or shall
more than two new trials be granted to a party upon the ground that the verdict
is not sustained by the evidence." It does not appear that this phrase played
any significant role in the rules governing new trials for inadequacy of damages.8 Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d (1933).
9 Id. at 982; Owing's Adm'r v. Gradison Constr. Co., 241 Ky. 5, 6-7, 43
S.W.2d 327, 328 (1931); Lawson's Adm'r v. Brandenburg, 240 Ky. 68, 72-73,
41 S.W.2d 201, 203 (1931); Outland v. Dayer, 235 Ky. 492, 495, 31 S.W.2d
725, 726 (1930); Veache's Adm'r v. Louisville & I. Ry. Co., 190 Ky. 678, 682-83,
228 S.W. 35, 37 (1921); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Williams Adm'r, 179 Ky.
333, 336, 200 S.W. 451, 452 (1918); Paducah Traction Co. v. Walker's Adm'r,
169 Ky. 721, 725, 185 S.W. 119, 121 (1916); Rossi v. Jewell Jellico Coal Co.,
157 Ky. 332, 335, 163 S.W. 220, 221 (1914); Schmidt v. Kentucky River Mills,
142 Ky. 80, 82, 133 S.W. 1142, 1143 (1911); Pendley v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co.,
28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1324, 1325, 92 S.W. 1, 1 (1906); Lloyd v. Knader, 22 Ky. L.
Rptr. 776, 58 S.W. 803 (1900); Jesse v. Shuck, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 463, 12 S.W.
304 (1889).
'o0 While this principle is repeatedly stated as dicta in the cases cited in
note 9 supra, there appear to have been few occasions for it to be relied upon
as an independent ground for reversal. Dunn v. Blue Grass Realty Co., 163 Ky.
384 173 S.W. 1122 (1915); Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367, 5 S.W. 867 (1887);
Taylor v. Howser, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 465 (1876).
11 Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367, 5 S.W. 867 (1887); Taylor v. Howser, 75
Ky. (12 Bush) 465 (1876).
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and this, for the very good reason that no rule or formula has been
evolved by which pain and suffering and permanent impairment
of ability to labor can be reduced to dollars, or that will show the
money value of any injury.
12
The repeal of section 341 and amendment of section 340(4)'3
was due largely to the crusading efforts of Court of Appeals Com-
missioner W. Truman Drury.1  Interestingly enough, Drury himself
had been a previous victim of the section when, as plaintiff in a
private lawsuit, he had received an inadequate award of general
damages which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.15
Despite the clear repeal of section 341, the Court's reluctance
to disturb a jury's verdict persisted.'( When the Kentucky Court
initiated the practice prescribed by section 340(4), it required trials
de novo with no consideration of the possibility of partial retrials.17
This practice probably was not dictated by the early common law
rule that verdicts were indivisible, 8 but was due instead to the
nonpervasiveness of existing laws pertaining to partial retrials.19
In 1953 the Civil Code of Practice was superseded by the Ken-
tucky Rules of Civil Procedure.20 Civil Rule 59.01(4) contains the
1
2 Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758. 791. 57 S.W.2d 969, 982 (1933).
13 An Act to Repeal Section Three Hundred Forty-One (341) and to Amend
and Re-enact Section Three Hundred Forty (340) of Article Five (5), Chapter
Two (2), Title Nine (9) of the Kentucky Code of Practice in Civil Cases,
Relating to New Trials, Ch. 27, [1936] Ky. Acts. 67.
§ 340 was amended to read:
The former verdict or decision may be vacated and a new trial be
granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the follow-
ing causes affecting materially his substantive rights .... (4) Excessive
or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice or in disregard of the evidence or the
instructions of the court. (Italics indicate addition.)
14 Drury, Constitutionality of the Kentucky Statute Refusing a New Trial
Because of the Smallness of Damages, 23 Ky. L.J. 453 (1935); Wolfford, Creation
and Accomplishments of the Judicial Council, 5 Ky. B.J. 31, 35 (1940).
15 Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933).16 Blincoe v. Drury, 311 Ky. 613, 224 S.W.2d 936 (1949);- Cuniffe's Ex'x
v. Johnson, 279 Ky. 663, 132 S.W.2d 47 (1939); Wilkins v. Hopkins, 278 Ky.
280, 128 S.W.2d 772 (1939).
37 Allen v. Large, 239 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1951); Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky.
198, 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949); Foster v. Dukes, 301 Ky. 752, 193 S.W.2d 159
(1946); Droppelman v. Willingham, 293 Ky. 614, 169 S.W.2d 811 (1943).
8 Edie v. East India Co., 96 Eng. Rep. 166, 167 (K.B. 1761).
19 Partial retrials to supply evidence needed for a final determination have
been used since 1835. Royal v. Miller, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 55 (1835). The Court
rejected the common law rule and held a verdict separable as to joint defendants
in Shelton v. Harlow, 54 Ky. 439, 15 B. Mon. 547 (1855). In 1924 the Court
ordered a partial retrial to reconsider one of two elements of damages. Zella
Mining Co. v. Collins, 203 Ky. 178, 261 S.W. 1090 (1924).20 The Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Court of Appeals
to take effect July 1, 1953 pursuant to an Act Relating to Rules of Pleading
Practice, and Procedure and the Forms Thereof in Civil Actions and with Limited
Application, in Criminal Proceedings, Ch. 18, [1952] Ky. Acts 29, Ky. REv. STAT.
(Continued on next page)
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same provisions for a new trial as did section 340(4), but with an
important change in the introductory clause. Where the Civil Code
had provided that "[t]he former verdict or decision may be vacated
and a new trial be granted... ," Rule 59.01 provides that "[a] new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues for any of the following causes... ." (Emphasis added.)
In the 1955 case of Smith v. Webber,21 in which a partial retrial
was asked for inadequacy of damages, the Court distinguished be-
tween reversals for excessive and inadequate damages, recognizing
that the latter is much more likely to have been the result of a
failure to separate the issues of liability and damages (or, the result
of an application of the comparative negligence doctrine rather than
the law of contributory negligence). 2 2 Realizing that the result of
such a compromise on the issues would not only effectively deny the
plaintiff his day in court as to damages, but would also deny the
defendant his day in court as to liability, the Court laid down the
general rule that partial retrials should not be granted where it
appeared that the verdict was the result of compromise, and that
such compromise could be inferred from the inadequacy or in-
congruity of the verdict.23
The partial retrial provision of Rule 59.01 was first given effect
in Scuddy Mining Company v. Couch,2 4 which was appealed on the
issue of excessive damages. Faced with an appellant who had tvice
had the issue of liability resolved against him, the Court noted that,
"Under CR 59.01, the court has discretion to order a partial new
trial as to one or more issues where it appears that the issue in
question is severable from and not interwoven with the remaining
issues."25 While the plaintiff's proof of defendant's liability could
have had some influence on the amount of the verdict, such im-
propriety on the part of the jury would, in almost all cases of excessive
verdicts, be one of degree rather than of decision.
The next stage in the evolution of Rule 59.01 came in 1959 in
a case26 in which the judge erred in his finding of facts on mitigation
of damages, resulting in an inadequate award. Here the error was
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
§§ 447.151-57 (1952).
Code of Civil Practice § 340 was repealed by An Act Relating to Pleading
Practice and Procedure in Civil Actions and Criminal Proceedings, Ch. 84,
Sec. 5, f1952] Ky. Acts 214, 216.
21282 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1955).
22 Kentucky has no comparative negligence statute.
23 Smith v. Webber, 282 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Ky. 1955).
24 295 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1956).
25 Id. at 554.26 Carney v. Scott, 325 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1959).
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obvious and the severability was certain, and a new trial on the
sole issue of damages was awarded. This case fell squarely within
the exception to the general rule of Smith v. Webber, 7 as provided
by that case, that partial retrials could be used in cases of inadequate
damages "when it is clear that no injustice will result from so doing."28
This exception was subsequently invoked in one case where the
appellee-defendant neglected to fie a brief,29 and in another case
where a partial retrial was granted by the trial judge and the
appellant-defendant had not questioned the procedure.30 But in
most cases the general rule was followed and trials de novo ordered.31
With its decision in the principal case,32 it appears that the Court
has made the exception to the rule and that henceforth partial retrials
in the event of inadequate verdicts will be the general rule except
"where such would result in injustice."33 In justifying its decision,
the Court first made the following observations:
The mere fact alone that a verdict was reached by compromise
has never been recognized by this court as an independent ground
for granting a new trial or for reversing a judgment. In fact,
evidence that a verdict was reached by compromise is not even
admissible. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, it is difficult to
understand why an inferred compromise should be a basis for
granting a new trial on liability to a party who has not even asked
for it.
(Emphasis the Court's) 34
There seems never to have been an occasion for reversing on the
sole ground of compromise, and this is because compromise in fact
cannot be legally proved. But the reason evidence is not accepted
is not because it is irrelevant, but because there is no acceptable
form of evidence. The cases which have arisen in which a party
sought to prove compromise have been based upon affidavits of
jurors, and reliance on this form of evidence has invariably spelled
defeat for the offeror.35 The rationale of this result has nothing to
27282 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1955).
281d. at 348.
29 Phipps v. Biseeglia, 383 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1964).
30 Friar v. Webb, 394 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965).
31 City of Louisville v. Allen, 385 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1964); Meglemry v.
Bruner, 344 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1961); Vittitow v. Carpenter, 291 S.W.2d34 (Ky.
1956).32 Nolan v. Spears, 432 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1968).
33Id. at 428.
34 Id.
3 Turner v. Hall's Adm'r, 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952); Barnes v. Lucas,
249 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1952); Lucas v. Cannon, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 650 (1878);
Doran v. Shaw, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 411 (1826); Taylor v. Giger, 3 Ky. 595,
1 Hardin 586 (1808).
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do with compromises as such, but is concerned only with the stability
of verdicts.36
If we refuse to accept evidence of a juror that the verdict was
reached by compromise where the compromise is not apparent on
the face of the verdict, is there then any justification in ever inferring
a compromise?37 Obviously, such an inference will never be ap-
propriate unless we disapprove of compromise verdicts and are will-
ing to act upon them. Stating that ". . . the mere fact that the
jurors may have traded votes in reaching the verdict is not enough
basis for giving the defendant a new trial on the issue of liability... ;"31
the Court clearly is sanctioning compromise verdicts as such and
not merely rejecting an unsound inference. The Kentucky Court is
not alone in the view taken. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
found compromise verdicts to be a "time-honored right of a jury."39
Writers have argued that compromise verdicts reflect the community's
sense of overall fairness40 and make our harsh rule of contributory
negligence acceptable.41 Another line of argument, particularly ap-
plicable to our exclusionary rule of evidence, is that we are "straining
the gnat and swallowing the camel," and that until we are willing
to condemn all compromise verdicts, then we should ignore those
few which are obvious on the face of the verdict.4 2 Unfortunately,
the Kentucky Court has not given us the basis for its decision to
accept compromise verdicts, but rather has offered us a rhetorical
"Why not?"
a36 The Court decided against the admission of affidavits of jurors after noting
that:
....~ Such a practice, if tolerated, would be extremely dangerous. Itwould create a violent temptation for the losing party to tamper with
the jurors, and by private conversations with them after the trial, he
might, and frequently would, impose both on the jurors and the court
the after-thoughts of the jurors for their opinions in the jury room. Few
verdicts in disputed cases could stand if the parties shall be permitted,
by such after-conversations with the jurors, to bring before the court
what may be supposed to be their mistakes in law or fact, made out in
this way only. (Emphasis added.) Taylor v Giger, 3 Ky. 595, 1 Hardin
5863 (1808).
37This can be a much broader question than needs to be discussed here.
While the logic of one situation might apply equally to others, the concern here
is only with an inference to be coupled with a reversal on other grounds, i.e.,
a new trial granted for inadequacy of damages. This distinction may be of
importance if a factor to be considered is expediency.
38432 S.W.2d at 428.
39 Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 235, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
4
0 E.g., James, Remedies For Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New
Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur and Additur, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 143,
150 (1963).
41 Id. at 151, n. 39.
42This reasoning is raised and rejected by at least one author. Wilson,
The Motion for New Trial Based on Inadequacy of Damages Awarded, 39 NEB.
L. REv. 694, 713-14 (1960).
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The argument against compromise verdicts is that in a jurisdiction
following the doctrine of contributory negligence the jurors must
keep separate the issues of liability and damages. Where the com-
promise is occasioned by evidence of contributory negligence, as
is believed to be most often the case,43 the resulting verdict is a
crude application of the principle of comparative negligence.44 The
debate over which theory is better must rage on unresolved, at least
for the time being. It is noted here only that compromise verdicts
cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of contributory negligence
and must be considered an exception to it.
The Court in Nolan goes on to stress that the defendant should
cross-appeal, pointing out trial errors, if he desires a new trial on the
issue of liability.45 Unless the defendant was entitled to a directed
verdict or summary judgment, it is difficult to see the relevance of
such an appeal. Certainly, if the defendant could point to trial
errors which denied him a fair hearing on liability, then he should,
and no doubt would, be granted a new trial on that issue. But the
question of compromise is never reached in such a situation. The
question of compromise will arise only where there have been no
other significant errors upon which the defendant can base an appeal,
and clearly there could be a compromise verdict even if there had
been no trial errors. In that situation, the verdict would be found
to conform to the law and the evidence (but perhaps only insofar
as the defendant's cross-appeal is concerned) and the defendant's
liability would be finally established. 46
Compromise was previously referred to as a crude form of com-
parative negligence. If the principle case had merely condoned a
compromise verdict as a just decision, then there would be little
cause to comment. But the case goes much further than comparative
negligence would take us and allows the plaintiff the benefit of a
new trial restricted to the issue of damages, a trial in which he will
probably recover a substantially greater award. Thus, all arguments
to the effect that juries, through compromise verdicts, merely temper
the law of contributory negligence with justice must be abandoned,
43 Id. at 694.
44 .Tames, supra note 40, at 151.
45 432 S.W.2d at 428. Note also that the non-appealing defendant cannot
expect the inadequate verdict to be affirmed to offset trial errors prejudicial to
his position. Vittitow v. Carpenter, 291 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1956). But see
Ray v. .eifries, 86 Ky. 367. 5 S.W. 867 (1887), where this was done.4 6 Allen v. Large, 239 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1951): Foster v. Dukes, 301 Ky.
752, 193 S.W.2d 159 (1946): Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198, 223 S.W.2d 734
(1941); Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933).
1969]
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for it is this very act which is nullified by the grant of a new trial
on the issue of damages alone.
The Court included what may become a very important caveat
to its rule on partial retrials by stating that, "We conclude that the
cases involving inadequacy of damages should be governed by the
general rule which favors the directing of limited or partial retrials
except where such would result in injustice... f1 (Emphasis added.)
What situations fall into this category? We can readily eliminate
all irregularities in proof of damages, for these are to be retried in
even the limited new trial. But if we adhere to the theory that an
award of damages, no matter how inadequate, necessarily means
that the jury found the defendant negligent and plaintiff not guilty
of contributory negligence,48 what remains? The answers to these
questions will, no doubt, be resolved as particular cases arise in
which an exception is obviously necessary. Perhaps the Court will
recognize that "passion and prejudice" are not necessarily factors of
degree, but may also be factors of decision, and re-evaluate the
"resolution of liability" theory at least as to awards of nominal and
"less than substantial and inadequate" damages.49 Perhaps the scales
will be balanced through a closer scrutiny of errors alleged by the
defendant in his cross-appeal in those cases where liability is unclear.50
In any event, it cannot be believed that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
will allow a plaintiff to use this case to parlay a sympathy verdict, or
any other undeserved verdict, into a windfall.
Jerry Lee Foster
Wou aN's ConMENsAnoN--"ExcLusIvE RwnY" CLAusE-TnmD
PARTY INDEMNr= Srr.-In 1948, the Jackson County Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation [hereinafter Jackson] constructed a distribu-
tion line running from its electric transmission line in Clay County.
In 1950, the Kentucky Utilities Company [hereinafter KU] constructed
an electric transmission line which crossed Jackson's line and was
erected at a height of six feet or more above the highest point on
47 432 S.W.2d at 428.
48 See note 45, supra.
49 Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 188, 66 S.W.2d
57, 58-59 (1933), suggests that verdicts which are inadequate are peversely
stated verdicts for defendant. Cf., Baries v. Louisville Elec. Light Co., 118 Ky.
830, 80 S.W. 814 (1904).
50 Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 186, 66 S.W.2d
57, 58 (1933), suggests that this was the practice as to inadequate awards of
general damages prior to amendment of Code of Civil Practice § 340.
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